Yayun Shen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Yayun Shen has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Faure
Faculty of Law Maastricht University Maastricht The Netherlands
3 shared publications - Chengcheng Ma
Institute for Intelligent Society Governance, Tsinghua University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Management
- Vol. 360, 121215
Understanding food waste sorting behavior in institutional food services: An integrated psychological framework
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Management
- Vol. 360, 121215
Understanding food waste sorting behavior in institutional food services: An integrated psychological framework
- Open Access
- 9 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 3-18
Behavioural instruments in environmental law and policy: Potential and challenges
The behavioural revolution in law and economics led to the insight that command‐and‐control and market‐based instruments have limitations in bringing about behavioural change. Environmental behavioural instruments use persuasive strategies or techniques rather than direct incentives to encourage environmentally responsible decision‐making. This article investigates the potential and challenges of behavioural instruments in environmental policy based on a survey of theories and examples concerning environmental behavioural instruments. Behavioural instruments can reduce the information costs of environmental regulation while increasing self‐efficacy for environmental compliance. More importantly, behavioural instruments can be cheap and effective by activating various norms in specific contexts. However, the behavioural approach, because of its focus on individual compliance, may not be well suited to address (transboundary) externalities. Behavioural instruments are especially important in generating positive externalities by appealing to social norms. Such mechanisms are, however, less suited to internalising negative externalities. The effects of behavioural instruments may not be easily guaranteed (in the long run), especially when the environmental goal of the behavioural approach clashes with private interests or fails to consider individual differences and contextual factors. We therefore argue that behavioural instruments should be included alongside standard regulatory tools, thus reaching an optimal mix between both.
- 9 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 3-18
Open AccessBehavioural instruments in environmental law and policy: Potential and challenges
The behavioural revolution in law and economics led to the insight that command‐and‐control and market‐based instruments have limitations in bringing about behavioural change. Environmental behavioural instruments use persuasive strategies or techniques rather than direct incentives to encourage environmentally responsible decision‐making. This article investigates the potential and challenges of behavioural instruments in environmental policy based on a survey of theories and examples concerning environmental behavioural instruments. Behavioural instruments can reduce the information costs of environmental regulation while increasing self‐efficacy for environmental compliance. More importantly, behavioural instruments can be cheap and effective by activating various norms in specific contexts. However, the behavioural approach, because of its focus on individual compliance, may not be well suited to address (transboundary) externalities. Behavioural instruments are especially important in generating positive externalities by appealing to social norms. Such mechanisms are, however, less suited to internalising negative externalities. The effects of behavioural instruments may not be easily guaranteed (in the long run), especially when the environmental goal of the behavioural approach clashes with private interests or fails to consider individual differences and contextual factors. We therefore argue that behavioural instruments should be included alongside standard regulatory tools, thus reaching an optimal mix between both.
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law
- Vol. 30 (3) , 396-408
Private standards for the public interest? Evidence from environmental standardization in China
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law
- Vol. 30 (3) , 396-408
Private standards for the public interest? Evidence from environmental standardization in China
- Open Access
- 10 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 183-199
Green building in China
Green buildings can play a role in helping countries meet their commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Green building can provide an important contribution to sustainability, for example, by improving energy efficiency, by improving indoor air quality, and by effective waste treatment. In practice, we see that there is an increasing interest in various forms of green building. However, the existing literature has not identified the role of law in promoting green building. It is, moreover, striking that green building has taken off in a rather impressive manner in China. Although generally there are still huge environmental problems with which China is confronted, for many years already China has been engaged in green building. This paper wants to examine what explains the relative success of green building in China; What specific legal instruments can be used to promote green building; and what lessons can be drawn more generally from experience in China? The paper uses the theory of smart regulation (Gunningham/Grabosky) and the economic analysis of law to examine the importance of different instruments in promoting green building. The paper comes to two key results, being that no single instrument in itself is optimal to promote green building as a result of which a smart mix needs to be designed to promote green building; moreover, for the specific case of China, it is the large government involvement in the economy that has been able to jump-start green building. The Chinese government has, on the one hand, mandated green building in government projects, but on the other hand, also used market-based instruments (like subsidies and public procurement) to promote green building.
- 10 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 183-199
Open AccessGreen building in China
Green buildings can play a role in helping countries meet their commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Green building can provide an important contribution to sustainability, for example, by improving energy efficiency, by improving indoor air quality, and by effective waste treatment. In practice, we see that there is an increasing interest in various forms of green building. However, the existing literature has not identified the role of law in promoting green building. It is, moreover, striking that green building has taken off in a rather impressive manner in China. Although generally there are still huge environmental problems with which China is confronted, for many years already China has been engaged in green building. This paper wants to examine what explains the relative success of green building in China; What specific legal instruments can be used to promote green building; and what lessons can be drawn more generally from experience in China? The paper uses the theory of smart regulation (Gunningham/Grabosky) and the economic analysis of law to examine the importance of different instruments in promoting green building. The paper comes to two key results, being that no single instrument in itself is optimal to promote green building as a result of which a smart mix needs to be designed to promote green building; moreover, for the specific case of China, it is the large government involvement in the economy that has been able to jump-start green building. The Chinese government has, on the one hand, mandated green building in government projects, but on the other hand, also used market-based instruments (like subsidies and public procurement) to promote green building.