Haowen Chan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Haowen Chan has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hsu-Chun Hsiao
National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
2 shared publications - Adrian Perrig
CyLab/Carnegie Mellon University
1 shared publication - Adrian Perrig
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication David G. Andersen
1 shared publication- Dawn Song
University of California, Berkeley
1 shared publication Geoffrey Hasker
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 June 2011
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foundations and Trends® in Databases
- Vol. 3 (3) , 149-201
Secure Distributed Data Aggregation
We present a survey of the various families of approaches to secure aggregation in distributed networks such as sensor networks. In our survey, we focus on the important algorithmic features of each approach, and provide an overview of a family of secure aggregation protocols which use resilient distributed estimation to retrieve an approximate query result that is guaranteed to be resistant against malicious tampering; we then cover a second family, the commitment-based techniques, in which the query result is exact but the chances of detecting malicious computation tampering is probabilistic. Finally, we describe a hash-tree based approach that can both give an exact query result and is fully resistant against malicious computation tampering.
- 8 June 2011
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foundations and Trends® in Databases
- Vol. 3 (3) , 149-201
Secure Distributed Data Aggregation
We present a survey of the various families of approaches to secure aggregation in distributed networks such as sensor networks. In our survey, we focus on the important algorithmic features of each approach, and provide an overview of a family of secure aggregation protocols which use resilient distributed estimation to retrieve an approximate query result that is guaranteed to be resistant against malicious tampering; we then cover a second family, the commitment-based techniques, in which the query result is exact but the chances of detecting malicious computation tampering is probabilistic. Finally, we describe a hash-tree based approach that can both give an exact query result and is fully resistant against malicious computation tampering.
- 11 March 2011
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-Generation Networks
We present the first Internet architecture designed to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of independent routing sub-planes, called trust domains, which then interconnect to form complete routes. Trust domains provide natural isolation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic, provide meaningful and enforceable trust and enable scalable routing updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic consequence of good design principles avoiding piecemeal add-on protocols as security patches. Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a few top-tier ISPs in the trust domain are trusted for providing reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a high level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.
- 11 March 2011
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-Generation Networks
We present the first Internet architecture designed to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of independent routing sub-planes, called trust domains, which then interconnect to form complete routes. Trust domains provide natural isolation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic, provide meaningful and enforceable trust and enable scalable routing updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic consequence of good design principles avoiding piecemeal add-on protocols as security patches. Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a few top-tier ISPs in the trust domain are trusted for providing reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a high level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.