Colin M. Barry
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Colin M. Barry has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- K. Chad Clay
University of Georgia
3 shared publications - Matthew DiGiuseppe
Leiden University
2 shared publications Michael E. Flynn
Kansas State University
2 shared publications- Amanda Murdie
University of Georgia
1 shared publication David L. Cingranelli
Binghamton University
1 shared publicationGregory Robinson
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 47-63
Violence, Predation, and FDI Entry
I present a theoretical framework that links different configurations of organized violence to global patterns in foreign direct investment (FDI). Insurgents, states, and rogue government agents all use violence for political purposes (i.e., incapacitating rivals), but they vary in how they use violence for economic purposes (i.e., generating income). Applying Olson’s (1993) concepts of “roving” and “stationary” banditry, I hypothesize that violence perpetrated by rebels and rogue agents indeed depresses a host country’s commercial appeal, but that violence perpetrated willfully by the state doesn’t. This claim is tested against data on FDI “entry” by several thousand multinational corporations between 1994 and 2018.
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 47-63
Open AccessViolence, Predation, and FDI Entry
I present a theoretical framework that links different configurations of organized violence to global patterns in foreign direct investment (FDI). Insurgents, states, and rogue government agents all use violence for political purposes (i.e., incapacitating rivals), but they vary in how they use violence for economic purposes (i.e., generating income). Applying Olson’s (1993) concepts of “roving” and “stationary” banditry, I hypothesize that violence perpetrated by rebels and rogue agents indeed depresses a host country’s commercial appeal, but that violence perpetrated willfully by the state doesn’t. This claim is tested against data on FDI “entry” by several thousand multinational corporations between 1994 and 2018.
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 48 (2) , 327-344
Labor rights in comparative perspective: The WorkR dataset
We present new data on labor laws and practices for all countries of the world, recorded annually from 1994 to 2010. The dataset covers seven different labor standards. These are freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wage, limitations on working hours, protection from unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, protection from forced and compulsory labor, and protection of children and young people. This list reflects an array of internationally recognized labor rights and closely corresponds with the standards identified in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. A simple analysis demonstrates the utility of the dataset and showcases some of the ways it might be used as a powerful tool in the scientific study of labor rights specifically, and human rights more generally. Presentamos nuevos datos sobre leyes y prácticas laborales para todos los países del mundo. Estos datos se registraron anualmente desde 1994 hasta 2010. El conjunto de datos abarca siete normas laborales diferentes. Se trata de la libertad de asociación, la negociación colectiva, el salario mínimo, la limitación de la jornada laboral, la protección contra las condiciones de trabajo inseguras e insalubres, la protección contra el trabajo forzado y obligatorio, y la protección de los niños y los jóvenes. Esta lista incluye una serie de derechos laborales reconocidos internacionalmente y se corresponde estrechamente con las normas identificadas en la Declaración sobre los Principios y Derechos Fundamentales en el Trabajo de la OIT de 1998. Mediante un sencillo análisis, se demuestra la utilidad del conjunto de datos y se muestran algunas de las formas en que podría utilizarse como una herramienta eficaz en el estudio científico de los derechos laborales en particular, y de los derechos humanos en general. Nous présentons de nouvelles données sur les lois et pratiques du travail pour tous les pays du monde qui ont été enregistrées annuellement de 1994 à 2010. Le jeu de données couvre sept normes du travail différentes. Elles comprennent la liberté syndicale, les négociations collectives, le salaire minimum, la limitation du temps de travail, la protection contre les conditions de travail dangereuses et insalubres, la protection contre le travail forcé et obligatoire et la protection des enfants et des jeunes. Cette liste reflète toute une série de droits du travail internationalement reconnus et correspond étroitement aux normes identifiées dans la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail de 1998. Une analyse simple démontre l’utilité de ce jeu de données et présente certaines des façons dont il pourrait être utilisé en tant qu’outil puissant dans l’étude scientifique des droits du travail en particulier, et des droits de l’homme de manière plus générale.
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 48 (2) , 327-344
Labor rights in comparative perspective: The WorkR dataset
We present new data on labor laws and practices for all countries of the world, recorded annually from 1994 to 2010. The dataset covers seven different labor standards. These are freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wage, limitations on working hours, protection from unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, protection from forced and compulsory labor, and protection of children and young people. This list reflects an array of internationally recognized labor rights and closely corresponds with the standards identified in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. A simple analysis demonstrates the utility of the dataset and showcases some of the ways it might be used as a powerful tool in the scientific study of labor rights specifically, and human rights more generally. Presentamos nuevos datos sobre leyes y prácticas laborales para todos los países del mundo. Estos datos se registraron anualmente desde 1994 hasta 2010. El conjunto de datos abarca siete normas laborales diferentes. Se trata de la libertad de asociación, la negociación colectiva, el salario mínimo, la limitación de la jornada laboral, la protección contra las condiciones de trabajo inseguras e insalubres, la protección contra el trabajo forzado y obligatorio, y la protección de los niños y los jóvenes. Esta lista incluye una serie de derechos laborales reconocidos internacionalmente y se corresponde estrechamente con las normas identificadas en la Declaración sobre los Principios y Derechos Fundamentales en el Trabajo de la OIT de 1998. Mediante un sencillo análisis, se demuestra la utilidad del conjunto de datos y se muestran algunas de las formas en que podría utilizarse como una herramienta eficaz en el estudio científico de los derechos laborales en particular, y de los derechos humanos en general. Nous présentons de nouvelles données sur les lois et pratiques du travail pour tous les pays du monde qui ont été enregistrées annuellement de 1994 à 2010. Le jeu de données couvre sept normes du travail différentes. Elles comprennent la liberté syndicale, les négociations collectives, le salaire minimum, la limitation du temps de travail, la protection contre les conditions de travail dangereuses et insalubres, la protection contre le travail forcé et obligatoire et la protection des enfants et des jeunes. Cette liste reflète toute une série de droits du travail internationalement reconnus et correspond étroitement aux normes identifiées dans la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail de 1998. Une analyse simple démontre l’utilité de ce jeu de données et présente certaines des façons dont il pourrait être utilisé en tant qu’outil puissant dans l’étude scientifique des droits du travail en particulier, et des droits de l’homme de manière plus générale.
- 17 June 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 72 (1) , 132-146
Transparency, Risk, and FDI
A central theme in the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is that political risk deters investment. The empirical record, however, is mixed. multinational corporations (MNCs) continue to invest in high-risk countries. We argue it is not merely about the level of risk, but rather firms’ ability to quantify risk. When MNCs can confidently assess both the nature and the degree of the threats present, they can take appropriate measures to hedge against them. This should increase their willingness to invest, even in higher risk environments. We contend that the ability to accurately quantify risk is a function of political transparency. Among opaque countries, we expect risk to exert a deterring effect on FDI, as commonly theorized. Among more transparent countries, however, we expect that risk is a less salient concern for MNCs. We test this argument using firm-level data on the foreign operations of some of the world’s largest multinationals between 1995 and 2008. The evidence supports the argument. Risk has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of investment at lower levels of transparency, but the magnitude of this effect weakens at higher levels of transparency. This pattern is consistent across multiple types of political risk, and is most pronounced in nonextractive (relative to extractive) industries.
- 17 June 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 72 (1) , 132-146
Transparency, Risk, and FDI
A central theme in the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is that political risk deters investment. The empirical record, however, is mixed. multinational corporations (MNCs) continue to invest in high-risk countries. We argue it is not merely about the level of risk, but rather firms’ ability to quantify risk. When MNCs can confidently assess both the nature and the degree of the threats present, they can take appropriate measures to hedge against them. This should increase their willingness to invest, even in higher risk environments. We contend that the ability to accurately quantify risk is a function of political transparency. Among opaque countries, we expect risk to exert a deterring effect on FDI, as commonly theorized. Among more transparent countries, however, we expect that risk is a less salient concern for MNCs. We test this argument using firm-level data on the foreign operations of some of the world’s largest multinationals between 1995 and 2008. The evidence supports the argument. Risk has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of investment at lower levels of transparency, but the magnitude of this effect weakens at higher levels of transparency. This pattern is consistent across multiple types of political risk, and is most pronounced in nonextractive (relative to extractive) industries.
- 27 February 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 154-164
Economic globalization and the economic policy positions of parties
Does economic globalization influence the economic policy positions adopted by political parties in democratic countries? In this article, we identify multiple pathways through which market integration might induce ideological change among both left and right parties. Utilizing data from 51 countries between 1970 and 2014, we evaluate the degree to which leftist and rightist economic ideologies, respectively, are present in parties’ platforms. We find that traditionally leftist positions are increasingly adopted by parties on both the right and the left in response to globalization. The evidence also suggests that, though there is a general tendency among parties to shift their economic platforms leftward in response to liberalization, there is significant between-country variability in the effects. An important implication of this study is that partisan ideological evolution is not driven solely by domestic forces, but by external factors, too.
- 27 February 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 154-164
Economic globalization and the economic policy positions of parties
Does economic globalization influence the economic policy positions adopted by political parties in democratic countries? In this article, we identify multiple pathways through which market integration might induce ideological change among both left and right parties. Utilizing data from 51 countries between 1970 and 2014, we evaluate the degree to which leftist and rightist economic ideologies, respectively, are present in parties’ platforms. We find that traditionally leftist positions are increasingly adopted by parties on both the right and the left in response to globalization. The evidence also suggests that, though there is a general tendency among parties to shift their economic platforms leftward in response to liberalization, there is significant between-country variability in the effects. An important implication of this study is that partisan ideological evolution is not driven solely by domestic forces, but by external factors, too.
- 9 February 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 25 (2) , 270-292
Peace and conflict at different stages of the FDI lifecycle
Theoretically, instability and violence should deter foreign investment. Empirically, the evidence has been inconsistent. I highlight two key deficiencies in existing research, and present a more nuanced theoretical framework for considering this relationship. First, I make the case that the costs and risks associated with conflict are a function of both intensity and duration. Both should be accounted for. Second, I argue that the logic governing multinational corporations' (MNC) behavior changes post-entry into the host country. Combining these two insights, I argue that firms’ sensitivity to conflict, and that the particular signals they respond to, vary in predictable ways across different stages of the FDI lifecycle. I test the according hypotheses using firm-level foreign investment data, and find supporting evidence. Multinationals look for sustained peace when pursuing new ventures, but prove resilient to all but the most intense and persistent conflicts after the costs of entry have been sunk.
- 9 February 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 25 (2) , 270-292
Peace and conflict at different stages of the FDI lifecycle
Theoretically, instability and violence should deter foreign investment. Empirically, the evidence has been inconsistent. I highlight two key deficiencies in existing research, and present a more nuanced theoretical framework for considering this relationship. First, I make the case that the costs and risks associated with conflict are a function of both intensity and duration. Both should be accounted for. Second, I argue that the logic governing multinational corporations' (MNC) behavior changes post-entry into the host country. Combining these two insights, I argue that firms’ sensitivity to conflict, and that the particular signals they respond to, vary in predictable ways across different stages of the FDI lifecycle. I test the according hypotheses using firm-level foreign investment data, and find supporting evidence. Multinationals look for sustained peace when pursuing new ventures, but prove resilient to all but the most intense and persistent conflicts after the costs of entry have been sunk.
- 23 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 42 (2) , 244-270
Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment
The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.
- 23 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 42 (2) , 244-270
Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment
The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.
- 15 June 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 69 (4) , 881-912
Profiting from Sanctions: Economic Coercion and US Foreign Direct Investment in Third-Party States
Scholarship on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has produced valuable insights into the role of host state characteristics and home-host relations. This study draws attention to another factor in investment decisions—the political and economic relations that home and host states maintain with third-party states. More narrowly, we focus on how investors respond to their home-state's imposition of economic sanctions against a trading partner. Greater economic integration has allowed states to use economic sanctions more frequently in recent decades. At the same time, economic sanctions are thought to have a distorting effect on global trade and financial flows as firms and governments adjust to new constraints. We argue that as firms at home in the sanctioning state respond to coercive measures against a trading partner by looking for alternative sources of profit, they will shift investments to states that can provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. In particular, those states that are perceived as prospective sanctions-busters—major trading partners of the sanctions target or states with a history of sanctions-busting behavior—will benefit disproportionately from the misfortune of others. We test this conjecture using data on US economic sanctions and global flows of US FDI from 1966 to 2000. The findings reveal that investor decision making in part responds to political developments beyond the home-host dyad.
- 15 June 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 69 (4) , 881-912
Profiting from Sanctions: Economic Coercion and US Foreign Direct Investment in Third-Party States
Scholarship on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has produced valuable insights into the role of host state characteristics and home-host relations. This study draws attention to another factor in investment decisions—the political and economic relations that home and host states maintain with third-party states. More narrowly, we focus on how investors respond to their home-state's imposition of economic sanctions against a trading partner. Greater economic integration has allowed states to use economic sanctions more frequently in recent decades. At the same time, economic sanctions are thought to have a distorting effect on global trade and financial flows as firms and governments adjust to new constraints. We argue that as firms at home in the sanctioning state respond to coercive measures against a trading partner by looking for alternative sources of profit, they will shift investments to states that can provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. In particular, those states that are perceived as prospective sanctions-busters—major trading partners of the sanctions target or states with a history of sanctions-busting behavior—will benefit disproportionately from the misfortune of others. We test this conjecture using data on US economic sanctions and global flows of US FDI from 1966 to 2000. The findings reveal that investor decision making in part responds to political developments beyond the home-host dyad.
- 15 December 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (1) , 86-98
Choosing the Best House in a Bad Neighborhood: Location Strategies of Human Rights INGOs in the Non-Western World
- 15 December 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (1) , 86-98
Choosing the Best House in a Bad Neighborhood: Location Strategies of Human Rights INGOs in the Non-Western World
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 51 (5) , 574-588
Freedom of foreign movement, economic opportunities abroad, and protest in non-democratic regimes
Allowing or restricting foreign movement is a crucial policy choice for leaders. We argue that freedom of foreign movement reduces the level of civil unrest under non-democratic regimes, but only in some circumstances. Our argument relies on the trade-offs inherent in exit and voice as distinct strategies for dealing with a corrupt and oppressive state. By permitting exit and thereby lowering its relative costs, authoritarians can make protest and other modes of expressing dissatisfaction less attractive for potential troublemakers. Liberalizing foreign movement can thus function as a safety valve for releasing domestic pressure. But the degree to which allowing emigration is an effective regime strategy is shaped by the economic opportunities offered by countries receiving immigrants. We find that freedom of foreign movement and the existence of economic opportunities abroad reduce civil unrest in non-democratic states. However, at high levels of unemployment in the developed world, greater freedom of foreign movement actually increases protest.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 51 (5) , 574-588
Freedom of foreign movement, economic opportunities abroad, and protest in non-democratic regimes
Allowing or restricting foreign movement is a crucial policy choice for leaders. We argue that freedom of foreign movement reduces the level of civil unrest under non-democratic regimes, but only in some circumstances. Our argument relies on the trade-offs inherent in exit and voice as distinct strategies for dealing with a corrupt and oppressive state. By permitting exit and thereby lowering its relative costs, authoritarians can make protest and other modes of expressing dissatisfaction less attractive for potential troublemakers. Liberalizing foreign movement can thus function as a safety valve for releasing domestic pressure. But the degree to which allowing emigration is an effective regime strategy is shaped by the economic opportunities offered by countries receiving immigrants. We find that freedom of foreign movement and the existence of economic opportunities abroad reduce civil unrest in non-democratic states. However, at high levels of unemployment in the developed world, greater freedom of foreign movement actually increases protest.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 57 (3) , 532-544
Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment1
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 57 (3) , 532-544
Open AccessAvoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment1