Chaewon Shin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chaewon Shin has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Donghyun Kwon
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Pusan National University
3 shared publications - Suhyeon Song
Department of Information Convergence Engineering, Pusan National University, Geumjeong-gu, Busan, Republic of Korea
3 shared publications Gowon Han
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Pusan National University, Busan, Geumjeong-gu, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication- Jaeyeol Park
Information Convergence engineering, Pusan National University
1 shared publication - Jinsun Park
Pusan National University
1 shared publication - Yoon-Ho Choi
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 682-700
Mind the Gap: In-Process Isolation for Safe Rust in WebAssembly
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 682-700
Mind the Gap: In-Process Isolation for Safe Rust in WebAssembly
- Open Access
- 17 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-25
TzPy: Python Runtime for Edge Code Deployment on TrustZone
As edge devices continue to improve in performance, their role is expanding in real-world environments such as smart factories and smart homes, where executing server-provided code on edge devices is essential for real-time processing and operational flexibility. However, edge code deployment introduces several security challenges, including the exposure of sensitive data and operations to runtime attacks, the absence of remote attestation mechanisms to validate code integrity and execution correctness, and insufficient access control for sensitive peripherals. Existing solutions address only a subset of these challenges and therefore fail to provide comprehensive security guarantees for edge devices. In this article, we present TzPy , a Python runtime designed for secure edge code deployment on ARM TrustZone. TzPy enables the execution of Python code entirely within the secure world. In addition, we design a remote attestation mechanism that verifies both the static integrity of deployed Python code and its runtime control flow through control-flow tracing. Furthermore, TzPy enforces a manifest-driven, fine-grained peripheral access control mechanism to prevent unauthorised or unintended access to sensitive devices. We evaluate TzPy on a Raspberry Pi 3B+ using a smart farm workload and a blinky application, and the results show an end-to-end overhead of 13.4%.
- 17 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-25
Open AccessTzPy: Python Runtime for Edge Code Deployment on TrustZone
As edge devices continue to improve in performance, their role is expanding in real-world environments such as smart factories and smart homes, where executing server-provided code on edge devices is essential for real-time processing and operational flexibility. However, edge code deployment introduces several security challenges, including the exposure of sensitive data and operations to runtime attacks, the absence of remote attestation mechanisms to validate code integrity and execution correctness, and insufficient access control for sensitive peripherals. Existing solutions address only a subset of these challenges and therefore fail to provide comprehensive security guarantees for edge devices. In this article, we present TzPy , a Python runtime designed for secure edge code deployment on ARM TrustZone. TzPy enables the execution of Python code entirely within the secure world. In addition, we design a remote attestation mechanism that verifies both the static integrity of deployed Python code and its runtime control flow through control-flow tracing. Furthermore, TzPy enforces a manifest-driven, fine-grained peripheral access control mechanism to prevent unauthorised or unintended access to sensitive devices. We evaluate TzPy on a Raspberry Pi 3B+ using a smart farm workload and a blinky application, and the results show an end-to-end overhead of 13.4%.
- Open Access
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 14, 5925-5939
WARD: Efficient Memory Protection for WebAssembly on Tiny Embedded Systems
WebAssembly (Wasm) has recently gained attention in embedded systems due to its lightweight runtime support and broad compatibility with various languages and platforms. However, Wasm’s linear memory model lacks internal protection mechanisms, making it vulnerable to a wide range of memory safety violations. To address this, prior work has proposed techniques for protecting memory within the linear memory space. While effective to some extent, these approaches either suffer from limited detection coverage or are unsuitable for resource-constrained embedded systems. In this paper, we present WARD, a redzone-based memory protection technique tailored for Wasm in tiny embedded systems. At its core, WARD employs a randomized linear-to-physical address translation mechanism, which enables effective detection of memory violations without requiring specific hardware extensions. Our evaluation shows that WARD provides improved memory detection coverage over prior techniques, with reasonable performance of 24.2% on benchmark and 13.03% on real-world applications, and memory overhead suitable for embedded systems.
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 14, 5925-5939
Open AccessWARD: Efficient Memory Protection for WebAssembly on Tiny Embedded Systems
WebAssembly (Wasm) has recently gained attention in embedded systems due to its lightweight runtime support and broad compatibility with various languages and platforms. However, Wasm’s linear memory model lacks internal protection mechanisms, making it vulnerable to a wide range of memory safety violations. To address this, prior work has proposed techniques for protecting memory within the linear memory space. While effective to some extent, these approaches either suffer from limited detection coverage or are unsuitable for resource-constrained embedded systems. In this paper, we present WARD, a redzone-based memory protection technique tailored for Wasm in tiny embedded systems. At its core, WARD employs a randomized linear-to-physical address translation mechanism, which enables effective detection of memory violations without requiring specific hardware extensions. Our evaluation shows that WARD provides improved memory detection coverage over prior techniques, with reasonable performance of 24.2% on benchmark and 13.03% on real-world applications, and memory overhead suitable for embedded systems.