CSChaewon Shin

Chaewon Shin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Chaewon Shin has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Mind the Gap: In-Process Isolation for Safe Rust in WebAssembly

    by Suhyeon Song, Chaewon Shin, Donghyun Kwon

  • Open Access

    TzPy: Python Runtime for Edge Code Deployment on TrustZone

    by Suhyeon Song, Jaeyeol Park, Chaewon Shin, Donghyun Kwon

    As edge devices continue to improve in performance, their role is expanding in real-world environments such as smart factories and smart homes, where executing server-provided code on edge devices is essential for real-time processing and operational flexibility. However, edge code deployment introduces several security challenges, including the exposure of sensitive data and operations to runtime attacks, the absence of remote attestation mechanisms to validate code integrity and execution correctness, and insufficient access control for sensitive peripherals. Existing solutions address only a subset of these challenges and therefore fail to provide comprehensive security guarantees for edge devices. In this article, we present TzPy , a Python runtime designed for secure edge code deployment on ARM TrustZone. TzPy enables the execution of Python code entirely within the secure world. In addition, we design a remote attestation mechanism that verifies both the static integrity of deployed Python code and its runtime control flow through control-flow tracing. Furthermore, TzPy enforces a manifest-driven, fine-grained peripheral access control mechanism to prevent unauthorised or unintended access to sensitive devices. We evaluate TzPy on a Raspberry Pi 3B+ using a smart farm workload and a blinky application, and the results show an end-to-end overhead of 13.4%.


  • Open Access

    WARD: Efficient Memory Protection for WebAssembly on Tiny Embedded Systems

    by Chaewon Shin, Gowon Han, Suhyeon Song, Jinsun Park, Yoon-Ho Choi, Donghyun Kwon

    WebAssembly (Wasm) has recently gained attention in embedded systems due to its lightweight runtime support and broad compatibility with various languages and platforms. However, Wasm’s linear memory model lacks internal protection mechanisms, making it vulnerable to a wide range of memory safety violations. To address this, prior work has proposed techniques for protecting memory within the linear memory space. While effective to some extent, these approaches either suffer from limited detection coverage or are unsuitable for resource-constrained embedded systems. In this paper, we present WARD, a redzone-based memory protection technique tailored for Wasm in tiny embedded systems. At its core, WARD employs a randomized linear-to-physical address translation mechanism, which enables effective detection of memory violations without requiring specific hardware extensions. Our evaluation shows that WARD provides improved memory detection coverage over prior techniques, with reasonable performance of 24.2% on benchmark and 13.03% on real-world applications, and memory overhead suitable for embedded systems.