Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games
Authors:
- 12 November 1996
- journal article
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 93 (23) , 13421-13428
Abstract
We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.Keywords
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