Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?
Authors:
- Ali Al-NowaihiAAAli Al-Nowaihi
- Paul LevinePLPaul Levine
- 1 April 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 33 (2) , 355-380
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- WAGE SETTING AND STABILIZATION POLICY IN A GAME WITH RENEGOTIATION *Oxford Economic Papers, 1992
- Sustainable PlansJournal of Political Economy, 1990
- Renegotiation in repeated gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 1989
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 1989
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with DiscountingEconometrica, 1988
- RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIESEconomic Inquiry, 1987
- Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- NONCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR AS A CREDIBLE THREATBulletin of Economic Research, 1985
- Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policyJournal of Monetary Economics, 1983
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesReview of Economic Studies, 1971