A Defense Mechanism for Timing-based Side-Channel Attacks on IoT Traffic
Authors:
- 1 December 2020
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Abstract
This work proposes FISHER: a deFense mechanIsm against timing-based Side-channel attack related to response time on the intERnet of things (IoT). IoT connects objects that support important applications, such as electronic health, smart homes, and Industry 4.0. However, timing-based side-channel attacks on IoT network traffic compromise user privacy. Related works present a limited view of side-channel leakages and as a solution, these works try to mask them. However, they ignore that devices have unique behaviors that intensify the problem of privacy leaks through response time. Hence, FISHER follows two modules: (i) vulnerability test and (ii) privacy protection. The vulnerability test module identifies timing-based side-channel leakages and reveals new vulnerabilities associated with the response time. The privacy protection module implements two methods that mask the identified time-based leakages on the network traffic. Results from an experimental scenario show that FISHER identifies precisely the side-channel leakages related to response time and efficiently masks them.Keywords
Funding Information
- CAPES (#88882.381944/2019-01,#88882.461738/2019-01)
- CNPq (#309129/2017-6,#432204/2018-0)
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