Intertemporal Emission Trading with a Dominant Agent: How does a Restriction on Borrowing Affect Efficiency?
- 23 August 2007
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 40 (2) , 217-232
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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