Abstract
Objective: We examine how the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PFP) systems in aligning managerial behavior with shareholder value depends on the joint interaction between executive risk appetite and corporate governance quality. We propose a “Prudent Risk-Taking Equilibrium” to explain how these opposing forces interact and influence incentive-system outcomes. Method: The sample comprises 1,106 firm-year observations from companies listed on the B3 (2018–2024), following the mandatory implementation of the Brazilian Corporate Governance Code. We employed multivariate panel-data regression models with firm and year fixed effects to test a three-way interaction among PFP structures, executive risk appetite, and governance compliance. Results: The findings indicate that high executive risk appetite strengthens the effects of short-term PFP but diminishes the outcomes of long-term PFP, whereas corporate governance has the opposite effect. The significant three-way interaction shows that strong governance channels high risk appetite toward effective performance. Governance substitutes for short-term bonuses and complements long-term incentives, ensuring that aggressive risk-taking generates sustainable value. Contributions: This research advances Agency Theory and the Behavioral Agency Model by demonstrating that governance mechanisms serve as channels that influence executive behavior. The empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of the Brazilian Corporate Governance Code’s “comply-or-explain” approach, indicating that adherence to governance best practices yields tangible economic benefits by improving incentive effectiveness. In practical terms, the findings emphasize that compensation schemes should be tailored to the firm’s governance maturity and executive characteristics.

This publication has 58 references indexed in Scilit: