Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game
Authors:
- Juergen BrachtJBJuergen Bracht
- Nick FeltovichNFNick Feltovich
- 1 October 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 93 (9-10) , 1036-1044
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
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