Exposing Weaknesses of Malware Detectors with Explainability-Guided Evasion Attacks

Authors:
  • WWWei Wang
    Wei Wang
  • RSRuoxi Sun
    Ruoxi Sun
  • TDTian Dong
    Tian Dong
  • SLShaofeng Li
    Shaofeng Li
  • MXMinhui Xue
    Minhui Xue
  • GTGareth Tyson
    Gareth Tyson
  • HZHaojin Zhu
    Haojin Zhu

Abstract
Numerous open-source and commercial malware detectors are available. However, the efficacy of these tools has been threatened by new adversarial attacks, whereby malware attempts to evade detection using, for example, machine learning techniques. In this work, we design an adversarial evasion attack that relies on both feature-space and problem-space manipulation. It uses explainability-guided feature selection to maximize evasion by identifying the most critical features that impact detection. We then use this attack as a benchmark to evaluate several state-of-the-art malware detectors. We find that (i) state-of-the-art malware detectors are vulnerable to even simple evasion strategies, and they can easily be tricked using off-the-shelf techniques; (ii) feature-space manipulation and problem-space obfuscation can be combined to enable evasion without needing white-box understanding of the detector; (iii) we can use explainability approaches (e.g., SHAP) to guide the feature manipulation and explain how attacks can transfer across multiple detectors. Our findings shed light on the weaknesses of current malware detectors, as well as how they can be improved.