Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion
Authors:
- Ingela AlgerIAIngela Alger
- Ching-To Albert MaCMChing-To Albert Ma
- 1 February 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 50 (2) , 225-247
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the optimality of allowing collusionJournal of Public Economics, 1996
- A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)Review of Economic Studies, 1996
- Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance GameThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1994
- Anomalies: CooperationJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1988