Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank‐Order Tournaments
Authors:
- 1 July 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 77 (1) , 1-14
Abstract
In rank‐order tournaments, undesirable but output‐enhancing activities, such as cheating, may occur. Cheating may be especially tempting when one player has an advantage over another. We show that when audit probabilities are low (high), the leading (trailing) player has more incentive to cheat. Furthermore, we show that “correlated” audits are more effective at decreasing the frequency of cheating than independent audits. Finally, we show that differential monitoring schemes, where contestants are audited based on either their initial position or final ranking, more efficiently achieve full deterrence than schemes that monitor contestants with equal probability.Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Doping and cheating in contest-like situationsEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 2007
- The Performance-Enhancing Drug GameJournal of Sports Economics, 2004
- Risk Taking in Asymmetric TournamentsGerman Economic Review, 2004
- The Generation and Distribution of Knowledge: 21st International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 25–28, 2003, Monastery WienhausenJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2004
- Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo WrestlingAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field ExperimentAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- The economics of dopingEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 2002
- Pay Equality and Industrial PoliticsJournal of Political Economy, 1989
- Economic Contests: Comparative Reward SchemesJournal of Labor Economics, 1984
- Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1981