Banking crises and government intervention
Authors:
- Jaime H. García-PalaciosJGJaime H. García-Palacios
- Augusto HasmanAHAugusto Hasman
- Margarita SamartínMSMargarita Samartín
Open Access
- 1 December 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 15, 32-42
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
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