Dynamic and Nonuniform Pricing Strategies for Revenue Maximization
Authors:
- Tanmoy ChakrabortyTCTanmoy Chakraborty
- Zhiyi HuangZHZhiyi Huang
- Sanjeev KhannaSKSanjeev Khanna
- 1 January 2013
- journal article
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Computing
- Vol. 42 (6) , 2424-2451
Abstract
We consider the item pricing problem for revenue maximization, where a single seller with multiple distinct items caters to multiple buyers with unknown subadditive valuation functions who arrive in a sequence. The seller sets the prices on individual items, and we design randomized pricing strategies to maximize expected revenue. We consider dynamic uniform strategies, which can change the price upon the arrival of each buyer but the price on all unsold items is the same at all times, and static nonuniform strategies, which can assign different prices to different items but can never change it after setting it initially. We design pricing strategies that guarantee poly-logarithmic (in number of items) approximation to maximum possible social welfare, which is an upper bound on revenue. We also show that any static uniform pricing strategy cannot yield such approximation, thus highlighting a large gap between the powers of dynamic and static pricing. Finally, our pricing strategies imply poly-logarithmic approximation for revenue-optimal incentive compatible mechanisms, in multiparameter combinatorial auctions with subaddititve buyer valuations, which is the best known guarantee given by efficient mechanisms for both prior-free and Bayesian settings.Keywords
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