Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
Open Access
- 12 August 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (12) , 11725-11753
Abstract
In Lewisean signaling games with common interests, perfect signaling strategies have been shown to be optimal in terms of communicative success and evolutionary fitness. However, in signaling game models that involve contextual cues, ambiguous signaling strategies can match up to or even outperform perfect signaling. For a minimalist example of such a context signaling game, I will show that three strategy types are expected to emerge under evolutionary dynamics: perfect signaling, partial ambiguity and full ambiguity. Moreover, I will show that partial ambiguity strategies are the most expected outcome and have the greatest basin of attraction among these three types when sender and receiver costs are arbitrarily small or similar. I will demonstrate that the evolutionary success of partial ambiguity is due to being risk dominant, which points to a better compatibility with other strategy types.Keywords
Funding Information
- Narodowa Agencja Wymiany Akademickiej (PPN/ULM/2019/1/00222)
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