Epistemic Functions of Replicability in Experimental Sciences: Defending the Orthodox View

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Abstract
Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.
Funding Information
  • Narodowe Centrum Nauki (grant number 2019/35/B/HS1/03281)
  • H2020 European Research Council (640638)
  • Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

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