Service Cancellation and Competitive Refund Policy
Author:
- 1 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 28 (5) , 901-917
Abstract
Although previous research demonstrates the profitability of partial refund policies in a monopoly setting, there is a certain lack of ubiquity in practice about these refunds in competitive service markets. This raises the question of how a partial refund policy may work and whether it is even sustainable in a competitive environment. This study investigates how competition may influence the profitability and the equilibrium choice of refund policies. It is shown that partial refunds may endogenously change the nature of strategic interaction between service providers from local monopolies into a competition regime, which moderates the gains from exploiting the efficiency-enhancing effect of partial refunds. A whole range of pure-strategy equilibria can be obtained as a result of the interplay between the efficiency-improving and the competition-intensifying effects. When the capacity is small (large) such that the efficiency-improving (the competition-intensifying) effect is dominant, both firms in equilibrium follow identical partial (zero) refund policies. Moreover, interestingly, the symmetric firms may end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm follows a partial refund policy and the other adopts a zero refund policy.Keywords
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Economics of Service UpgradesJournal of Service Research, 2005
- Selling with “Satisfaction Guaranteed”Journal of Service Research, 1999
- Strategic Service Pricing and Yield ManagementJournal of Marketing, 1999
- Managing DissatisfactionJournal of Service Research, 1998
- Advance‐Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- Price and Money‐Back Guarantees as Signals of Product QualityJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1996
- Money back guarantees in retailing: matching products to consumer tastesJournal of Retailing, 1995
- Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral HazardThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988
- Competitive Promotional StrategiesThe Journal of Business, 1988
- The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political Economy, 1986