The Social Construction of Conspiracy Beliefs: A Q-Methodology Study of How Ordinary People Define Them and Judge Their Plausibility
Authors:
- 26 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Constructivist Psychology
- Vol. 35 (2) , 564-585
Abstract
Little is known about ordinary people’s understandings of conspiracy beliefs and how these understandings relate to the perspectives of researchers and scholars. Working within a social constructionist epistemological framework, we conducted a Q-methodology study aiming to identify a range of lay perspectives on two key topics: the defining features of conspiracy beliefs; and aspects considered important in judging their plausibility. Fifty-six people (32 men and 24 women), recruited via regional UK Facebook groups, sorted their agreement with a set of statements on each of the two topics. A principal component analysis, followed by varimax rotation, was performed on each data set. Five accounts about the defining features of conspiracy beliefs were identified: that they are false, illogical and harmful; that they are forms of political critique; that there are varied types; that they are entertaining but ineffectual; and that they are held by a self-reinforcing minority. Four accounts about their evaluation were identified: conventional realist criteria; the importance of personal judgment; skeptical realism; and the assessment of critical thinking. The findings are discussed in the context of the literature and limitations of the study are considered. Implications for research and educational and policy interventions are outlined.Keywords
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