Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited
Author:
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 86 (1) , 107-112
Abstract
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Funding Information
- European Commission
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory PricingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1998