Matching through institutions
Authors:
- Francis BlochFBFrancis Bloch
- David CantalaDCDavid Cantala
- Damián GibajaDGDamián Gibaja
- 1 May 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 121, 204-231
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Secretaría de Ciencia, Humanidades, Tecnología e Innovación (A1-S-11222)
- Universidad de Chile
- Concordia University
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
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- School Choice: A Mechanism Design ApproachAmerican Economic Review, 2003
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