Transparent US monetary policy: theory and tests
Authors:
- 1 March 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 44 (7) , 813-824
Abstract
In 1994, the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. This article assesses the impact of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate forecast dispersions and ex post forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. The empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty about future monetary policy.Keywords
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