Agency‐Theory and Internal‐Labor‐Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms
- 1 December 1998
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 7 (4) , 573-613
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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