Liquidity Provision vs. Deposit Insurance: Preventing Bank Panics Without Moral Hazard
Author:
- Antoine MartinAMAntoine Martin
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind ofKeywords
All Related Versions
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