Work hard, not smart: Stock options in executive compensation
Authors:
- John M. BarronJBJohn M. Barron
- Glen R. WaddellGWGlen R. Waddell
- 1 June 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 66 (3-4) , 767-790
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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