Clinical sympathy: the important role of affectivity in clinical practice
Author:
- 27 March 2019
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (4) , 499-513
Abstract
Bioethics has begun to see the revaluation of affects in medical practice, but not all of them, and not necessarily in the sense of affects as we know them. Empathy has been accepted as important for good medical practice, but only in a way that strips it of its affectivity and thus prevents other affects, like sympathy, from being accepted. As part of a larger project that aims at revaluing the importance of affectivity in medical practice, the purpose of this paper is to develop a clinical sympathy that can serve as a trainable skill for medical professionals. While everyday sympathy may be problematic as a professional skill for physicians, this does not imply that sympathy should be entirely rejected. As a natural part of our moral psychology, sympathy is an intersubjective affect that aids in our interactions with others and our decision-making abilities. I present here a theory of clinical sympathy as an affective response to patients, in which physicians are both attuned to their affective response and understand how their affects are influencing their beliefs and judgments. In this way, clinical sympathy serves as a trainable skill that can aid physicians in their interactions with their patients.Keywords
This publication has 67 references indexed in Scilit:
- Effectiveness of empathy in general practice: a systematic reviewBritish Journal of General Practice, 2013
- The Devil is in the Third Year: A Longitudinal Study of Erosion of Empathy in Medical SchoolAcademic Medicine, 2009
- The Problem of Empathy: Medicine and the HumanitiesNew Literary History, 2007
- Empathy and Patient–Physician ConflictsJournal of General Internal Medicine, 2007
- The ‘like me’ framework for recognizing and becoming an intentional agentActa Psychologica, 2007
- Clinical Empathy as Emotional Labor in the Patient-Physician RelationshipJAMA, 2005
- How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993
- The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993
- Conceptual and Semantic Development as Theory Change: The Case of Object PermanenceMind & Language, 1988
- The Child is a Theoretician, Not an Inductivist*Mind & Language, 1988