Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism
Author:
- 1 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 16 (4) , 285-304
Abstract
In the early 1970s the Swedish parties designed new rules for government formation. In this study it is shown that the choice of a new voting rule stemmed from a combination of goaloriented behaviour and a process of socialization. In a cross national comparison, it is also shown that there exists an empirical correlation between the Swedish type of rule and (1) a high frequency of minority governments, (2) a high frequency of small minority governments and (3) a short government formation process. From the perspective of coalition formation theory, this is a challenging finding.Keywords
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