Egalitarian Equivalence And Strategyproofness In The Queueing Problem

Authors:
  • YCYoungsub Chun
    Youngsub Chun
  • MMManipushpak Mitra
    Manipushpak Mitra
  • SMSuresh Mutuswami
    Suresh Mutuswami

  • 1 January 2013
Abstract
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist. We also show that it is impossible to find a mechanism satisfying queue efficiency, egalitarian equivalence and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying two normative notions, egalitarian equivalence and no-envy, together.
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