Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
Authors:
- Oriana BandieraOBOriana Bandiera
- Luigi GuisoLGLuigi Guiso
- Andrea PratAPAndrea Prat
- Raffaella SadunRSRaffaella Sadun
- 1 July 2015
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 33 (3) , 623-681
Abstract
We exploit a unique combination of administrative sources and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data includes manager characteristics, such\ud as risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as ownership; detailed measures of managerial practices relative to incentives, dismissals and promotions; and measurable outcomes, for the firm and for the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentive provision generates an array of implications that can be tested with our data. Our contribution is twofold. We disentangle the role of risk-aversion and talent in de-termining how firms select and motivate managers. In particular, risk-averse managers are matched with firms whose compensation scheme depends less on performance. We also show that empirical findings linking governance, incentives, and performance that are typically observed in isolation, can instead be interpreted within a simple unified matching frameworkKeywords
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