Clearing, Counterparty Risk, and Aggregate Risk
Authors:
- Bruno BiaisBBBruno Biais
- Florian HeiderFHFlorian Heider
- Marie HoerovaMHMarie Hoerova
- 28 June 2012
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 60 (2) , 193-222
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Optimal clearing arrangements for financial tradesJournal of Financial Economics, 2012
- Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 2011
- Inducing Agents to Report Hidden Trades: A Theory of an IntermediaryReview of Finance, 2011
- Counterparty Risk in Financial Contracts: Should the Insured Worry about the Insurer?*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010
- Competition in Loan ContractsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and CorrelationEconometrica, 2000
- Private and Public Supply of LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- Liquidity provision, banking, and the allocation of interest rate riskEuropean Economic Review, 1994
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-ProtectionJournal of Political Economy, 1972