Inductive Influence
- 10 September 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 58 (4) , 689-708
Abstract
Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets , a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used to capture the Johnson–Carnap continuum of inductive methods, as well as the Nix–Paris continuum, and show how inductive influence can be measured.
Keywords
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