Predators or Protectors? Military Corruption as a Pillar of Regime Survival in Uganda
- 11 March 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Civil Wars
- Vol. 22 (2-3) , 313-332
Abstract
When he came to power in 1986, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni promised to establish a professional, disciplined and all-inclusive national army. More than three decades later, the Ugandan army under his leadership has constantly been entangled in record corruption scandals. Based on extensive field research, this article explores the nature of corruption in Uganda’s defence sector and shows how corruption is tolerated and sometimes encouraged by the regime leader because it serves as an instrument of political control. The article highlights pervasive corruption in the Ugandan army, the political use of corruption by the regime and the impact it has had more generally.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Combating political and bureaucratic corruption in Uganda: Colossal challenges for the church and the citizensHTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies, 2018
- Uganda's 2016 elections: Not even faking it anymoreAfrican Affairs, 2016
- Deliberate Indiscretion? How Political Corruption Encourages Discretionary Policy MakingComparative Political Studies, 2014
- Doing business out of war. An analysis of the UPDF's presence in the Democratic Republic of CongoJournal of Eastern African Studies, 2012
- THE EXTENT OF SINGLE SOURCING IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE AS A CORRUPTION RISK: A FIRST LOOKDefence and Peace Economics, 2009
- Supply-Side CorruptionJournal of Corporate Citizenship, 2008
- Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defense EstablishmentsConnections: The Quarterly Journal, 2008
- Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International CorruptionJournal of Business Ethics, 2005
- Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretationsThe Journal of Modern African Studies, 2001
- Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit AnalysisAmerican Political Science Review, 1967