Resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM) is an emerging non-volatile memory technology known for its energy efficiency, low latency, and compact size, making it ideal for data storage and in-memory computation. However, its security requires careful evaluation. ReRAM cells in crossbar arrays are vulnerable to conductance changes caused by sneak current paths during write operations. An adversary can exploit this vulnerability through write-hammer attacks by repeatedly writing to an aggressor cell to inject bit-flip faults in an adjacent victim cell. However, these attacks are not stealthy when monitoring schemes are used. In this paper, based on the knowledge acquired by analyzing the voltage and pulse length characteristics of ReRAM cells during the writing process, we propose SCARY, a stealthier technique that distributes write operations across multiple cells to evade detection. Extensive HSpice simulations using a ReRAM compact model demonstrate SCARY’s effectiveness in injecting faults while remaining stealthy compared to traditional write-hammer attacks.