Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
Author:
- James A. DeardenJDJames A. Dearden
- 1 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 34 (2) , 153-174
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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