Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Authors:
  • VBVicky Barham
    Vicky Barham
  • RBRobin Boadway
    Robin Boadway
  • MMMaurice Marchand
    Maurice Marchand
  • PPPierre Pestieau
    Pierre Pestieau

Abstract
The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analysed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
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