Buyer Liability and Voluntary Inspections in International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Study
Author:
- 1 May 2003
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 101-127
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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