Introduction to the Epistemology of Causation
Author:
- 25 November 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 4 (6) , 913-925
Abstract
This survey presents some of the main principles involved in discovering causal relations. They belong to a large array of possible assumptions and conditions about causal relations, whose various combinations limit the possibilities of acquiring causal knowledge in different ways. How much and in what detail the causal structure can be discovered from what kinds of data depends on the particular set of assumptions one is able to make. The assumptions considered here provide a starting point to explore further the foundations of causal discovery procedures, and how they can be improved.Keywords
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