Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance

Authors:
  • FKFlip Klijn
    Flip Klijn
  • JPJoana Pais
    Joana Pais
  • MVMarc Vorsatz
    Marc Vorsatz

  • 1 January 2019
Abstract
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if aschool can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches,we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.
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