SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Authors:
- 1 December 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 07 (04) , 395-406
Abstract
This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.Keywords
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