Strategic agility orientation? The impact of CEO duality on corporate entrepreneurship in privatized Vietnamese firms
Open Access
- 31 December 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of General Management
- Vol. 45 (2) , 107-116
Abstract
This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) duality (a chief executive operating chair of board and leader of a firm) of newly privatized Vietnamese firms on the level of corporate entrepreneurship; this understanding is used to throw light on the extent to which a position of strategic agility is achieved. Specifically, does CEO duality enable firms to keep consistent with their vision, while remaining flexible in their business model? Data from a survey of 114 CEOs of board and top management team members in privatized firms in Vietnam were collected and examined through a combination of agency theory and stewardship theory. The research finds that CEO duality does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of entrepreneurial activity in privatized Vietnamese firms. The results have policy implications for shaping corporate governance and management implications for firms striving to be competitive, in ways that advance corporate entrepreneurship in economies such as Vietnam that are both emerging and pursuing privatization.Keywords
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