Tarski on Logical Consequence
Author:
- Mario Gómez-TorrenteMGMario Gómez-Torrente
Open Access
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- Published by Duke University Press in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Vol. 37 (1) , 125-151
Abstract
This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the $\omega$-rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, and notably John Etchemendy, who have claimed that his definition does not satisfy those desiderata. A secondary aim of the paper is to offer some basic elements for an understanding of Tarski's definition in the historical logico-philosophical context in which it was proposed. Such historical understanding provides useful insights on Tarski's informal ideas on logical consequence and their internal cohesion.Keywords
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