This book is an examination of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective called ‘‘Second Philosophy’’. On a generally metaphysical account of the Tractatus, a key unnaturalistic assumption can be isolated. When it’s removed, the general outlines of the resulting position on the ground of logic come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher’s roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture rooted in the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even more thorough harmony. The parting comes when the Second Philosopher elaborates and confirms the account with empirical investigations into logical structure and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle.