Contracting creativity: patronage and creative freedom in the Italian Renaissance art market
- 18 January 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Review of Economic History
- Vol. 27 (3) , 311-335
Abstract
We study contractual solutions to creative disagreements in the market for original paintings using a sample of ninety commission documents from Renaissance Italy (1285–1530). We investigate the determinants of creative freedom by comparing the length of the description of the final painting with variables capturing painter-, patron-, and commission-specific characteristics. Our results suggest that corporate patronage was positively associated with creative freedom for the painter as compared to individual patrons. We also find evidence that the reputation of the painter at commission and larger commission values are negatively associated with creative freedom.Keywords
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