Doubt, Despair, and Doxastic Agency: Kierkegaard on Responsibility for Belief
Author:
Open Access
- 9 April 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Vol. 107 (4) , 671-705
Abstract
Although doubt ( Tvivl ) and despair ( Fortvivlelse ) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief. First, I show that an important yet largely overlooked form of Kierkegaardian despair involves either failing to take ethico-religious responsibility for one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs, or misusing one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs by refusing to recognize or comply with externally given ethico-religious norms governing belief. Second, I argue that Kierkegaard takes properly exercising one’s agency over one’s beliefs to matter because beliefs are partly constitutive of the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) that Kierkegaard regards as the cure for despair.Keywords
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