Environmental capacity feedback reshapes eco-evolutionary game dynamics
Open Access
- 30 October 2026
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 5 (11)
Abstract
Environmental conditions often change on timescales similar to evolutionary dynamics, yet classical game-theoretic models typically assume fixed payoffs that ignore such ecological feedbacks. Here, we introduce an eco-evolutionary game framework in which the payoffs to cooperators and defectors are directly shaped by the fraction of free space, the unoccupied environmental capacity that determines opportunities for growth, colonization, and resource renewal. In our model, free space evolves in response to population composition and, in turn, modifies strategic incentives by altering the payoffs of cooperators and defectors in proportion to available free space. Using a combination of analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we characterize all equilibrium states and derive explicit feasibility and stability conditions under free-space feedback. We show that this ecological capacity coupling fundamentally reorganizes evolutionary outcomes. Free-space feedback can prevent strategy extinction, stabilize coexistence in parameter regimes where classical models predict collapse, and generate persistent oscillations through supercritical Hopf bifurcations. These oscillations often correspond to endogenous cyclic dominance among cooperators, defectors, and the free-space component, an emergent behavior impossible under static payoffs. Our results demonstrate a minimal mechanism by which simple ecological constraints can produce rich eco-evolutionary dynamics, including recovery from collapse and long-term coexistence. By embedding environmental capacity directly into the payoff structure, this framework offers a tractable approach for understanding how resource availability and spatial opportunity regulate cooperation in ecological communities, microbial populations, and social–ecological systems.Funding Information
- Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency (P1-0403)
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