Venture Capital, Double-sided Adverse Selection, and Double-sided Moral Hazard
Author:
- Eike HoubenEHEike Houben
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertiKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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