VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION GAMES: EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Authors:
- Mark BagnoliMBMark Bagnoli
- Michael MckeeMMMichael Mckee
- 1 April 1991
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 29 (2) , 351-366
Abstract
This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate a mechanism for the voluntary provision of public good. The public good is provided if the total contributions meet or exceed a threshold and all contributions are returned if the public good is not provided. The members of the group all know the threshold, the incomes, and the valuations assigned the public good by all other members. The results support the prediction that this mechanism will yield Pareto efficient outcomes and suggest that economic agents adopt strategies which form equilibria satisfying certain refinements to the Nash equilibrium.Keywords
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