Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
Author:
- Aaron L. Bodoh-CreedABAaron L. Bodoh-Creed
- 1 July 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 75 (2) , 518-537
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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