Do investors want politically connected independent directors? Evidence from their forced resignations in China
Authors:
- Rui HuRHRui Hu
- Khondkar KarimKKKhondkar Karim
- Karen Jingrong LinKLKaren Jingrong Lin
- Jinsong TanJTJinsong Tan
Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 61, 101421
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Sun Yat-sen University
- American Accounting Association
- China's National Nature Science Foundation (71272196, 71572206, 71790603)
- Key project of Human and Social Science Funds of Guangdong Province, China (2012JDXM-0002)
- China Ministry of Finance's Project to Support Accounting Masters
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