Some lessons from incentive theory: Promoting quality in bus transport
Authors:
- Manuel González-DíazMGManuel González-Díaz
- Ángeles Montoro-SánchezÁMÁngeles Montoro-Sánchez
- 1 March 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Transport Policy
- Vol. 18 (2) , 299-306
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
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